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Abstract
We will present some ideas about sharing a secret in a monotonic access structure. We show
the relations which occur between the method of encrypting a monotonic access structure with
the use of basis sets or maximal unprivileged sets, and that based on a logical formula (used
by Benaloh and Leichter in [1]). We will also give some facts connected with the problem
of security, including the aspects of a hierarchy security in the structure. The method of
encrypting a monotonic access structure using a family of basis sets or a family of maximal
sets that cannot reconstruct the secret will be described in a general way. Some aspects of
using the latter based on a logical formula will be also given. Any (general) access structure
can be encrypted by each of them but the way of sharing a secret is quite different and usually
a specified method has to be chosen to achieve a desirable level of security and time complexity.
1. Introduction
The question of how to distribute a secret among a group of participants such
that only certain subgroups, called privileged, could reconstruct it was answered
in 1979 by Blakley [2] and Shamir [3]. The Shamir scheme with the threshold
k frequently used allows to distribute a secret number s to n participants, such
that any k or more entities can reconstruct it, but not fewer. This threshold
scheme is denoted by (k,n). Typically it is realized by a polynomial f of the
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degree k−1, in which the free term represents the secret value s, and the shares
of n participants are nodes of the form (x, f(x)). With k of these nodes we can
reconstruct the polynomial (corresponding system of equations would have a
unique solution), so in particular we can read a free term. As we can see, in the
threshold systems we do not choose which groups of participants are privileged
and we have only some freedom in choosing k, that is the minimal size of a
group that can reconstruct the secret. Ito, Seito, Nishizeki in their work [4]
from 1987 described a general method of distributing a secret such that only
previously chosen, privileged subsets can reconstruct it. Then in [1] Benaloh
and Leichter proposed a simpler and more efficient way of sharing a secret for
a monotonic access structure. They have also given an example of a family of
base sets which was of type {{A,B}, {C,D}} that generates a monotonic access
structure that cannot be realized by a generalized threshold scheme (in which
each participant could receive several shares). This shows in particular, that if
we want to have a freedom in choosing privileged sets for a monotonic access
structure, we have to introduce some new ideas. One of the ideas, proposed in
[1] which fulfills our requirements is based on a logical formula, the other one
on a method using a family of maximal unprivileged sets, see also [5]. We will
show some properties of the method in [1] and its relations to that based on
the families of sets. We would also discuss efficiency and security issues.
2. Preliminaries
At the beginning we introduce some definitions and terminology.
Let X = {P1, ..., Pn} be a set of all entities and P (X) a set of all subsets of X.
A family Γ of subsets, that can reconstruct the secret is an access structure,
and the elements of that family are called privileged sets. We say that an access
structure is monotonic if every superset of a privileged set is also in the access
structure. A minimal element of an access structure Γ is a set in Γ such that
its every proper subset is not in Γ. We call a family of minimal sets a basis
of an access structure, which we will denote by B. On the other hand, every
subset of P (X), which is not in Γ can be extended to the maximal set not in Γ.
That kind of subset is called maximal and adequate family a family of maximal
unprivileged sets, denoted by N.
Theorem 1. One can determine a unique access structure by providing a
family of basis sets B or by saying what family of maximal unprivileged sets N
is.
Proof. It is clear that a family of basis sets uniquely determines an access
structure. We will show that having a family of maximal unprivileged sets N
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we can uniquely reconstruct the basis. Assume otherwise, let B1 and B2 be two
different bases determined by N. Without loss of generality we may assume
that there exists B ∈ B2 such that B /∈ B1. We have two possible cases:
1) B is a superset of certain B′ ∈ B1, i.e. B
′ ⊆ B (but we do not have equality),
then B′ is not in the access structure Γ2 so we may extend B
′ to the maximal
unprivileged set, but sets from N obviously do not include basis sets so that
cannot be true.
2) B is not a superset of any B′ ∈ B1, i.e. B is not in the access structure Γ1.
Similarly to that before, extension of B leads to the contradiction.

Instead of determining an access structure by giving a base one can also,
as in [1], use a method with a logical formula consisting of a conjunction and
disjunction but without negation (these are called monotonic logical formulas).
Taking such a formula F on the variables indexed by a set P , the access structure
defined by F is the family of these subsets A of a set P for which F is true
precisely when the variables indexed by A have a logical value 1.
For example for a formula (a1∨a2)∧a3 we have P = {1, 2, 3} and the family
of base sets of access structure defined by this formula is {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
3. Characterization of schemes
We will briefly show the way of distributing a secret proposed by Benaloh and
Leichter [1] and the other method based on a family of basis sets or a family
of maximal unprivileged sets, see also [5], then we will draw some attention to
practical aspects of those methods.
A general method of sharing a secret described in [1] uses a monotonic logical
formula. If s is a secret value that is going to be shared, we distribute it
by going to more and more detailed parts of the formula (as we will see it
in the example below) until we get to each participant. In particular, where
we have disjunction, all of its components receive the same part of actually
distributed part of a secret. Where we have conjunction, we divide randomly
actually distributed part of a secret to a sum of si that sums up to this part
and each of the components of the conjunction receives si. In this method of
distributing a secret we may allow a threshold distribution, which means that
when there is disjunction we use a threshold scheme with threshold 1 (which
is equivalent to the method described earlier) and when there is conjunction
of k components we use a threshold scheme with the threshold k. When using
a threshold distribution for reconstruction, we have to remember identities of
parts.





As for example, we will distribute in a ring modulo m a secret value s ∈
{0, 1, ...,m − 1} to entities {1, 2, 3} with a structure defined by the formula
(a1∧a3)∨(a2∧a3). First we look at the disjunction so s is distributed to a1∧a3
and to a2∧a3. Now looking at a1∧a3 we randomly divide s into two parts s1, s2
such that s1+s2 = s and give s1 to entity 1 and s2 to entity 3. Similarly, getting
s3 and s4 such that s3+s4 = s we distribute them to entities 2 and 3 respectively.
It is also worth considering the formula ((a1 ∨ a2) ∧ a3) ∨ (a1 ∧ (a2 ∨ a3) ∧ a4)
defining an access structure, where firstly s is distributed to both components
of disjunction, then in the left component it is divided into appropriate s1 and
s2 where s1 is given to entities 1 and 2, s2 to entity 3 (here instead of dividing s
into two parts we could use the Shamir scheme with threshold 2). In the right
component of the formula s is divided randomly into s3, s4 and s5 which are
distributed: s3 to entity 1, s4 to entities 2 and 3 and s5 to entity 4 (here we
could also use the Shamir scheme with threshold 3). We also notice that for a
formula (a1 ∨ a2)∧ (a3 ∨ a4)∧ . . . ∧ (a2n−1 ∨ a2n) each entity would get only
one number.
Let us now describe the generalized method of creating a monotonic access
structure from a family of basis sets or a family of maximal unprivileged sets,
see also [5]. Let us consider a set of all entities X = {P1, . . . , Pn} and an access
structure Γ. Let us assume we have a family of k maximal unprivileged sets
N = {N1, . . . , Nk}. We can think of it as it is given and it determines the
family of basis sets B or firstly we had a basis and it determined N. We will
distribute with the use of special function f subsets Si of S = {a1, . . . , ak} to
the participants. It means that entity Pi will receive the value f(Si). Function
f is a function for which the following condition holds:
f (f(A) ∪ f(B)) = f(A ∪B),
where A, B are certain sets. Notice that the examples of functions for which
this condition holds are identity on the subsets of S or f being the least common
multiple, when S is a set of pairwise coprime numbers least common multiple
is understood here as a function that takes on the input a set and returns a
singleton consisting of an element being the least common multiple. This kind
of function ’forgets’ the repeated terms of inputs and we can use it in sharing a
secret by giving to participants for shares the values of f in certain sets. Value of
f in the sum of all sets used for the construction of shares would be a secret that
is going to be distributed among participants. Our function f is publicly known
and safety issues are connected with choosing the function. Reconstructing the
secret will be performed by taking values as in the left hand side of the equation
that f satisfies. Notice that connecting f(A∪B) with a share f(C) of a certain
participant we compute f (f(A ∪ B) ∪ f(C)) = f(A ∪ B ∪ C) as we wanted
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for the process of reconstruction. Going back to distributing the shares to the
participants, for each Ni ∈ N, we connect ai with every entity of X except those
which are in Ni. So we have connected a subset Si ⊆ S with every participant
Pi . After computing the value f(Si) that value is given to the participant Pi
as his share. Notice that participants from a selected basis set can reconstruct
the secret, because taking B ∈ B and selecting any value ai, there would be
participant B who received ai (if not then B ⊆ N for certain N ∈ N and it
cannot happen). Because neither participants from the set Ni ∈ N has received
ai we may use it to set up safety conditions for our sharing scheme (depending
on the chosen f). For example for f being the least common multiple we may
require elements of S to be appropriately large pairwise coprime numbers, larger
than a certain threshold (safety) value, [5].
4. Dependencies
The methods of determining an access structure from a family of base sets
and determining it with a monotonic logical formula are related and any access
structure can be defined using each of them.
Theorem 2. Let F be any monotonic logical formula that defines an ac-
cess structure Γ. Converting F to the disjunctive normal form (i.e. equivalent
formula which is a disjunction of conjunction of the literals) and making reduc-
tions of a type (a∨ b)∧ a⇔ a such that there are no clauses contained (as sets
of literals) in other clauses, sets made of indices of clauses define a basis of Γ.
As a remark, the formula (a1 ∨a2)∧a3 is equivalent to (a1 ∧a3)∨ (a2 ∧a3) and
so we can read the basis.
Proof. Let B’ be a family of sets that were formed from the reduced
disjunctive normal form, as described in the theorem. We will show that B’ =
B, where B is the family of basis sets of Γ.
For any B ∈ B setting variables indexed by the elements of B to 1 gives
a value of F equal to 1 no matter what the values of other variables are. In
particular, setting all other variables to 0 we conclude that there exists B′ ∈ B’
such that B′ ⊆ B and because the sets from B’ are also in the access structure
Γ we have B′ = B, which shows that B ⊆ B’
Now, let us take any B′ ∈ B’. As we know, it is in the access structure
and we will show that it does not contain properly any basis set (which is
enough). If it contained properly certain B ∈ B then, from what we have just
shown, B′ would have a proper subset from B’. That cannot be true since





B’ was constructed from the reduced form. This shows that B′ ∈ B and so
B’ ⊆ B. 
There is a dual theorem for maximal, unprivileged sets.
Theorem 3. Let F be any monotonic logical formula that defines an access
structure Γ. Writing F in a conjunctive normal form (i.e. logical formula which
is a conjunction of disjunction of the literals) which is reduced such that there
are no clauses contained (as sets of literals) in other clauses (using (a∧b)∨a⇔
a), sets forming a family of maximal, unprivileged sets N are constructed by
operation of choosing one clause of the formula and writing all indices except
those that are indexing the chosen clause.
Proof. Let N’ be a family of sets constructed as stated in the theorem.
Any set N ′ ∈ N’ is not in the access structure because setting variables indexed
by elements which are not in N ′ to 0, i.e. all variables in a certain clause, we
have the value of that clause equal to 0 so F is false. Let us call the clause
selected for the construction of N ′ by C. We will show that N ′ is maximal. In
each clause different from C we can find a variable indexed by an element of
N ′, if not then there would exist a clause different from C which is contained
(as a set) in the selected clause C and this cannot occur as the formula F is
reduced. For that reason when we add any other element to N ′ it would be from
a selected clause and setting appropriate variables to 1 the formula F would be
true.
Let us take any maximal unprivileged set N ∈ N. It is not in the access
structure so the formula F is false when setting all variables indexed by N to 1
and others to 0. That means a certain clause has to have value 0 so there are
not any variables indexed by N in that clause. Because of N being maximal
all indices indexes apart from those indexing the mentioned clause are in N so
N is in N’. 
We also observe that having a basis B it is easy to construct a logical for-
mula that defines the same access structure, similarly to a family of maximal,
unprivileged subsets. These results indicate, for example, that after encoding
the access structure using one of the described methods it may be possible to
encode it using the other one.
Sometimes it is much easier to construct a monotonic access structure using
a logical formula. For example if we have a group of n pairs of entities of the
form (2i− 1, 2i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and want to construct such a structure that
for reconstruction of the distributed value s we need at least one entity from
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each pair, then we can describe it shortly by a formula:
(a1 ∨ a2) ∧ (a3 ∨ a4) ∧ . . . ∧ (a2n−1 ∨ a2n)
The family of basis sets would consist of 2n elements, in each there would be
exactly one element of each pair. On the other hand, the family of maximal
unprivileged sets would have n elements. Depending on a method of distributing
a secret for a monotonic access structure the number of basis sets, maximal
unprivileged sets or the number of parts from which the logical formula consists
is important for the time complexity of the scheme.
Some aspects of hierarchical structure of the access structure including those
connected with hiding places that entities take in the hierarchy may sometimes
also be important. Looking from this perspective at the sharing schemes that
were described, more suitable is the scheme which uses a family of maximal
unprivileged sets and a function f being the least common multiple. For our
set S of distributed values connected with entities we take a set of certain
prime numbers or pairwise coprime numbers. An aspect of security in this case
is based on the problem that it is hard to compute how many distinct prime
divisors or distinct coprime parts (that come from the process of distributing the
shares) does a composite number (here, the share) have. That is because each
entity Pi, intuitively speaking, is the more important (higher in the hierarchy)
the larger is its set Si of distributed numbers connected to it (recall that the
share of Pi is the least common multiple of elements of Si, not the set Si itself).
When distributing the prime numbers we have the problem of telling how many
distinct prime divisors a composite number have, which is considered to be
comparatively difficult for the problem of factorization of a composite number
which, as we know, is considered to be hard. Distributing coprime parts instead
of prime numbers is in that case even better. For security reasons one has to
guarantee the proper size of shares and that shares are not divisible by one
another. It can be achieved by modifying the family of basis sets as presented
below.
We will consider the case when there is no entity that is able to reconstruct
the secret by himself (which is a natural assumption while sharing a secret).
Theorem 4. Having a family of basis sets B such that no entity can re-
construct the secret by himself, it can be guaranteed that subsets Si connected
with the entities in a process of distributing the shares are not contained in one
another.
Proof. Let Γ be the access structure determined by the family of basis
sets B. Looking at the elements of sets from the family B, if two entities Pj





and Pk are both the elements of a certain basis set, then their corresponding
subsets Sj and Sk would not be contained in one another (in the family of
maximal, unprivileged sets N there would be a set that contains entity Pj and
does not contain the entity Pk, and the other set for which the opposite is
true). On the other hand, if for entities Pj and Pk there is no basis set that
these entities are the elements of, we add a new auxiliary entity Pl to the set
of entities and create a new basis set from the entities Pj , Pk, Pl. The family
of sets with the additional set is again a basis (the sets that previously were
in B still do not contain proper subsets of the access structure because the
only new sets in Γ are those that contain the new basis set). Due to this, all
previous connections between entities have been preserved, and the additional
entity is only auxiliary. We perform the described procedure for all such pairs
of entities and create a new basis B’. After obtaining from B’ the family of
maximal unprivileged sets N’ and distributing the shares as it was described,
the condition from the theorem is fulfilled. 
4.1. Example
Let us consider a set of entities {P1, P2, P3, P4} and the family of basis sets
B = {{P1, P2}, {P1, P3}, {P2, P3}, {P1, P4}}. One may easily see that the family
of maximal unprivileged sets N = {{P1}, {P2, P4}, {P3, P4}}.
The most privileged entity (highest in the hierarchy) is P1 because he can
reconstruct the secret cooperating with any other entity. The least privileged
entity is P4 because he can reconstruct the secret only with P1. One may also
see that after performing the steps described in the proof of the theorem above
because the pairs of entities P2 and P4, similarly P3 and P4 are not the elements
of any basis sets, we obtain
B’ = {{P1, P2}, {P1, P3}, {P1, P4}, {P2, P3}, {P2, P4, P5}, {P3, P4, P5}} and
N’ = {{P1, P5}, {P2, P4}, {P2, P5}, {P3, P4}, {P3, P5}, {P4, P5}} where P5 is the
auxiliary entity.
While using logical formulas, the elements distributed (as shares) to a certain
entity have a strictly specified meaning and so, in the process of reconstructing
the secret value s we need to use the information about the access structure
(for example which of the distributed elements one should use in the specified
groups of entities to finally reconstruct s). This information may be used by a
third party to gain knowledge about the access structure.
5. The ways of secret sharing in the monotonic access structures
and possibilities of corruption
We will give and describe the ways the entity that constructs the monotonic
access structure can share the information about it with the participants.
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– The information about the possible groups of entities that can reconstruct
the secret is publicly available for every entity in the structure.
– Every entity has the information only about the groups of participants with
whom he can reconstruct the secret.
– The information about the possible privileged groups is given to a certain
(trusted) external entity and the participants obtain incomplete information
about privileged groups that they construct.
– The information about the privileged groups is given to a certain trusted
external entity and every participant receives incomplete information about the
privileged groups he is an element of.
First, the simplest method, in which information about the basis sets is pub-
licly known is at the same time the least secure. Adversary, after corrupting
any entity, gains the whole information about the hierarchical structure in the
access structure. This information helps him choose the strategically best for
him ’path of corruption’, which after being performed, allows him to reconstruct
the secret.
In the second method, entity has only partial information about the hierarchy
in the structure and so strategies of an adversary after corrupting an entity are
limited.
The third method uses an entity, who knows the whole family of basis sets.
Entities even during the meetings would not be able to tell which privileged
groups they are constructing (unless it is a meeting of such a group) because
they do not know if the value they are reconstructing is the actual secret. The
outer subject on the other hand, in some situations can disclose to entities
information about the privileged groups. That is also helpful with protection
against the corruption of entities, i.e. corrupted entities do not have the whole
information about what other entities should be corrupted to reconstruct the
secret.
In the fourth method each entity has even less knowledge about the family
of basis sets. Planning the strategy of corrupting the entities of the structure
is therefore even more difficult.
The third and fourth methods made use of an additional, external entity, af-
ter corruption of whom, we have the same situation as in the first method. His
introduction, however, leads to new possibilities in using such a system, which
may be interesting from the practical point of view. At some point though, the
additional entity may adjudge that it is necessary to reveal to the certain group
of entities the information that they can reconstruct the secret.





6. Security issues in sharing a secret
So far we have shown some safety aspects connected with monotonic access
structures. We will now present the others, that are known in the literature,
however, it is important here to realize the fact of what should be taken into
consideration while constructing an access structure. In particular, we will see
what assumptions could be made about possible attacks on the structure.
Generally, examining a sharing system one introduces some models that allow
him to prove within them certain issues connected with security of a system [6],
[7]. Here, we will present some of those models and possible attacks and types
of an adversary related to them. One usually considers two basic models of
exchanging information. First, called cryptographic [7], assumes that everyone
has access to the information that is being exchanged between the participants
of the scheme. Security of the scheme in such a model has to be guaranteed by
a computationally hard problem, which adversary would not be able to solve in
a reasonable time. Then there is the information-theoretic model [8], [9], which
assumes that entities communicate with the use of pairwise secure channels. In
this case safety is guaranteed even if an adversary has unlimited computing
power. Let us now look at the sharing scheme from the aspect of possible
corruption that could be performed by the adversary. The important concept
here is the idea of adversary structure, which is a family of sets of entities, that
may be corrupted by an adversary (for example it may consist of all subsets
of cardinality less than a threshold value t). Passive corruption means that
the adversary only acquires information about shares of corrupted participants,
who (if they want) can perform reconstruction of the secret correctly. The
corruption is called active, when the adversary takes full control of corrupted
participants and the rest (not corrupted participants) cannot say which of the
others were corrupted. We may also distinguish types of adversaries as being
static or adaptive. Static adversary corrupts a set of participants only once
and during the time the set does not change. Adaptive adversary can corrupt
new participants at any time during the protocol, based on the information he
gathers during the time, as long as the total set of corrupted participants is in
the adversary structure.
The most appropriate model of computation is selected and depends on the
type of practical purpose of sharing scheme as well as the issues connected with
its implementation, safety and computational efficiency, and after setting a type
of adversary, the features of the system are examined.
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7. Conclusions
We have presented some ideas which could be also taken into consideration
when constructing another than the presented methods of sharing a secret in
the access structure. As we have shown, at the more general level, a method
of constructing the access structure from a family of basis sets or a family of
maximal unprivileged sets, and a method using a logical formula are similar.
They both allow to construct any general access structures and after coding the
structure using one of them there is a possibility to code it using the other one
(at least theoretical, because sometimes coding using the other structure would
be computationally too complex). Going into details about the schemes, we
saw that in certain situations often connected with security or time complexity
it is better to use the specified one. This depends on what we are expecting
from our sharing system. Some other aspects of constructing a sharing scheme
may sometimes be important as well. One can see that in the Shamir scheme
it is easy to dynamically add a new entity because we give him an argument
(his identity) and the value in this argument of the polynomial that we use
in the scheme. Looking at the method with a logical formula or with fami-
lies of sets we should verify and make new connections of the new entity and
the existing ones (that is because it is a general access structure). Therefore,
analyzing a sharing system that one wants to create, one has to prepare ear-
lier estimates of a number of entities, dynamics in the system i.e. the number
of possible addition and removal of entities and methods of implementation
related to them operations. One should also set the matters connected with
security which are going to be the most important for the scheme. We have pre-
sented how different levels of security are acquired depending on how the entity
that is constructing the access structure reveals the information about it to the
participants. As we point out, gathering information about hierarchical struc-
ture may help the adversary in setting the most suitable path of corruption for
him, after performing of which he reconstructs the secret. Hiding information
about a hierarchical structure can be performed by choosing an appropriate
method of sharing a secret (for example a method with the families of basis
sets) and a proper way of distributing the information about the structure by
the constructor of the access structure. Realizing and setting models of infor-
mation exchange (cryptographic/information-theoretical) and possible types of
corruption (active/passive) and types of an adversary (adaptive/static), as well
as setting the adversary structure for our system are crucial (although usually
clear from the purpose we want to use our structure for).
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